SPACE POLICY
LEARNING FROM COLUMBIA
Report blames NASA culture, foam strike for space shuttle loss
SUSAN MORRISSEY
A piece of foam was the physical cause of the space shuttle Columbia accident on Feb. 1 (C&EN, June 16, page 7). But NASA's shuttle program management practices, including scheduling pressures, were just as responsible, according to the final report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB).
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VERDICT Gehman (right) and moderator Laura Brown discuss the investigation of the loss of Columbia, shown blasting off from the Kennedy Space Center on Jan. 16.
PHOTO BY SUSAN MORRISSEY |
The 248-page report, released last week, points to NASA's history and organizational behavior--or culture--as a root cause of the tragedy. "We consider it unlikely that the accident was a random event; rather, it was likely related in some degree to NASA's budgets, history, and program culture, as well as to the politics," the report says.
Released just seven months after the catastrophic loss of the shuttle Columbia during its reentry into the atmosphere, killing all seven astronauts onboard, the comprehensive report provides a road map for changes at the agency, NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe explained.
"We get it," O'Keefe told reporters. It's not about changing faces; it's about making institutional changes, he said, adding that NASA will be focusing on examining and altering negative cultural practices.
The report is intended to serve as the basis for vigorous debate about the future of space missions, says CAIB Chairman retired Adm. Harold W. Gehman Jr. Congress is left to take up the policy questions, such as: How long should NASA fly the remaining shuttles? What is the proper balance of human and robotic missions?
To address these policy questions, a series of hearings are scheduled, beginning on Sept. 4 by the House Science Committee and the following week by the Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee. |